polaroid polaview 3000 lcd panel free sample

Repair Manual Polaview 3000 LCD Panel September 1996 Americas Business Center Technical Services 201 Burlington Road Bedford MA 01730 TEL: 1.781.386.5309 FAX: 1.781.386.5988...

with a native resolution of 1024x768 . The internal 3LCD technology is an innovative 3-chip design that sets itself apart by delivering vibrant, true-to-life images with better color brightness and a wider color gamut.

with a native resolution of 1024x768 . The internal 3LCD technology is an innovative 3-chip design that sets itself apart by delivering vibrant, true-to-life images with better color brightness and a wider color gamut.

Polaroid Corporation, manufacturer of one of the premiere brands of cameras for more than 50 years, faced a crisis in the 1990s as the rise of new technologies, in particular digital cameras, negated the company"s edge in the instant delivery of prints. After putting its account in review in 2000, Polaroid selected a new advertising agency, Leo Burnett Worldwide, to help rekindle the brand"s sagging fortunes. The focus over the next three years was on taking advantage of the successful launch of the small I-Zone and JoyCam cameras and the small adhesive-backed "sticky film" they used. The company"s target was teens, in particular 15- to 17-year-old girls.

Because the marketers were playing to an audience that normally rejected typical hard-sell appeals, they attempted to be innovative and engaging while subtly urging teens in both television spots and print ads to buy the cameras and apply the "sticky pics" to whatever surface struck their fancy. For example, one television spot featured a young woman jumping up and down on her bed, slapping Polaroid pictures on the ceiling. A print effort included an insert of pictures that could be applied as a form of commentary to an accompanying fake advertisement, and teens were encouraged to "hijack" real ads with their own sticky pics.

Over the course of three years Leo Burnett succeeded in many ways. Much of the work received industry awards, and Polaroid enjoyed sales spikes. The added revenue did not, however, stave off bankruptcy for the company, which never approached spending the $150 million the account was worth when Leo Burnett took over. Instead it was estimated that Polaroid, short on cash, spent only about $70 million a year. When the account was again put up for review in 2003, Leo Burnett opted not to participate, leaving the task of rebuilding one of the great brands in American history to others.

Polaroid Corporation grew out of the polarization research conducted by Edwin Land beginning in the 1920s. After developing a polarizing material he struggled to find a commercial application, initially finding success with the sale of sunglasses. On Christmas Day 1943, in a flash of inspiration, Land conceived of a camera and self-developing film utilizing his polarizing material. With Polaroid on the verge of financial ruin by 1946, Land placed all his hopes on the development of his instant camera. It was introduced into the market a year later with a great deal of fanfare and was an immediate hit.

During the 1950s the company grew rapidly and became a marketing success story. In the camera industry Polaroid played Pepsi to Kodak"s Coca-Cola. Much of Polaroid"s success was due to its creative approach to advertising. It was quick to take advantage of the rising popularity of television, enlisting early stars of the medium, like Tonight Show hosts Steve Allen and Jack Paar, to demonstrate Polaroid cameras in live television commercials. According to Stuart Elliott, writing for the

The proliferation of one-hour photography developing shops and the increasing popularity of digital photography dramatically changed the landscape for Polaroid during the 1990s. To counteract declining revenues in its core instant film business, Polaroid cut costs while attempting to diversify into such areas as medical imaging (a major failure), flashlights and batteries, and graphic arts. By the end of the decade, however, Polaroid decided to once again turn to the consumer market, this time focusing on a younger demographic market with the I-Zone Instant Pocket Camera, a slim camera producing small instant pictures, and the JoyCam, a smaller, lower-priced version of the company"s standard instant camera. Both were introduced in the second half of 1999. Polaroid also looked to expand its business in Europe and the Pacific and as a result dropped its advertising agency, Goodbye, Silverstein & Partners, in favor of Leo Burnett, which had global reach as a part of the Publicis Groupe. After taking over the Polaroid account, at the time worth about $150 million, in the spring of 2000, Leo Burnett launched a marketing campaign to promote the I-Zone and JoyCam following their successful introduction.

While the I-Zone and JoyCam were aimed at the 18-to-25 demographic, the cameras" core users were girls aged 15 to 17, and it was this audience that the ensuing campaign targeted. But it was a tricky population to address, given the marketing savvy possessed by contemporary teens, who from the cradle had been bombarded by advertising. They knew when they were being marketed to and were especially resistant to corporate, hardsell approaches. Polaroid knew its advertising would have to be innovative, witty, and engaging if it were to reach the mark. The goal was to make the I-Zone and JoyCam must-have items for teenage girls. Moreover the marketers wanted to establish I-Zone and JoyCam as enduring brands in the market, rather than mere fads soon to be abandoned by fickle teens. On all levels it was a tall order for Polaroid"s marketers.

Historically Polaroid"s strength in the photography field was the instant delivery of photographs. That edge eroded with the emergence of new technologies, however. Conveniently located photo shops and counters in mass retailers offering one-hour development cut into Polaroid"s market share, as consumers proved willing to trade off instant development of a single shot for the quick delivery of prints plus the film"s negatives in order to make multiple copies of favorite shots. Even more devastating to Polaroid was the introduction of digital photography and its rapid acceptance with mainstream consumers. Not only did digital cameras offer instant gratification, but poor shots could be immediately discarded and favorite ones transferred to home computers, from where they could be printed on ink-jet printers or sent by E-mail to friends and family.

The players in the new digital photography field included old-guard rivals Canon, Olympus, Fuji, Minolta, and Kodak, although the latter, like Polaroid, was not as nimble as the other companies to embrace digital photography. In addition Polaroid had to contend with a new breed of entrants in the field, including corporate giants like Hewlett-Packard, Nokia, and Samsung. What they may have lacked in track record in photography, they made up in large advertising budgets. Their combined marketing heft promoted digital photography, superseding traditional photography at a pace that took the likes of Polaroid and Kodak by surprise. Kodak was much larger and better diversified than Polaroid and had at least been a pioneer in digital photography, holding a number of key patents. It could always change its focus to digital technology, a step the company took in the 2000s. But Polaroid faced a far more serious crisis: how to survive in a marketplace that seemed to have passed it by.

Polaroid Corporation was established to produce polarizing material, which it initially attempted to sell to automakers for nonglare car headlights and windshields, but Detroit showed no interest. At the 1939 New York World"s Fair, Polaroid wowed the public with a three-dimensional film that required special filtering glasses. This time it was Hollywood"s turn to pass on Polaroid"s innovative technology.

Both television spots and print ads in the campaign followed the same game plan. According to Shoot magazine"s Fred Cisterna, "the high-energy ads show hip young adults having fun with the new cameras and with the Sticky Film." For example, the television spot titled "Ceiling" opened with the tease of a young woman jumping up and down out of the frame. Next the audience saw that she was jumping on her bed and with each leap was sticking a small Polaroid picture on her bedroom ceiling. In another ad, "Pasties," featuring a teen boy, the audience first saw two photos moving back and forth in time to a techno track of drums and bass. The payoff, as revealed in a widening shot, was that the pictures were stuck to the chest of a young man watching himself in a mirror and moving to the music.

Polaroid attempted to build on the campaign in 2001. The JoyCam was positioned as a social lubricant to consumers in their 20s in an adverting effort themed "It Only Comes Out at Night." Unlike the typical ads selling cameras or film that showed only appealing pictures, this series featured unflattering candid shots of partying young people. Again the marketers hoped to nudge the target audience not only to buy Polaroid"s small cameras but to take more pictures, thereby generating increased revenues. In 2001 Polaroid also launched an advertising campaign to promote its core product, introducing a new tagline, "Click, Instantly," which suggested that Polaroid pictures had the ability to bring people together in such a way that they clicked, helping to transform a boring party or mend fences between feuding couples. The company"s attempt on the one hand to forge a relationship with teens and on the other to remind an older demographic audience that it still had emotional relevance could not overcome the financial hole Polaroid had slipped into, however. In October 2001 Polaroid filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The company had no choice but to continue to spend money to promote its products or risk becoming virtually irrelevant in the marketplace, but because of its debts Polaroid would only be able to budget a fraction of the $150 million global account Leo Burnett thought it had won in 2000.

The campaign to pitch the I-Zone and JoyCam to the teen market continued in 2002. The most innovative work during the year came in the second half when Leo Burnett developed the concept of "hijacking." The inspiration came from copywriter Eric Routenberg, who one day spotted a Polaroid photo stuck on a bumper of a parked car. He told Aaron Baar of Adweek, "That car stopped being a car, and it was an ad for an I-Zone." Out of that experience grew a somewhat subversive, interactive print campaign that the agency hoped would appeal to teens. In several teen magazines Polaroid placed an insert of 32 sticky pics, of a scuba diver, a monkey face, and a man"s hairy chest, among others. On the next page was a fake print ad, which the users could comment on by affixing some of the stickers. The goal of these ads was to reengage the core market, to reacquaint people with the I-Zone product and urge them to use their own imagination in finding ways to make a statement using sticky pics—to in essence hijack ads and other images for their own purposes. A more practical objective for Polaroid was to simply increase much-needed sales in the fourth quarter of the year.

When Polaroid Corporation introduced the first instant-developing camera in 1947, it was priced at $89.75. The sepia-toned film cost $1.75 for eight exposures.

The work Leo Burnett did for Polaroid promoting the I-Zone, the JoyCam, and sticky film was successful in a number of ways. When the campaign broke in 2000 Polaroid experienced an immediate jump in sales, and research indicated that the target market liked the products a great deal, suggesting that they would not fade away like many fads. Leo Burnett also received industry recognition for some of the work it did over the course of two years. It received a 2001 Effie Award from the New York American Marketing Association. In 2002 the agency was a finalist for a Magazine Publishers of America Kelly Award and, among other distinctions, received the Best of Show and Award of Excellence in the Chicago Windy Awards, the Art Director"s Club of New York 2002 Merit, and Gold and Silver ADDY Awards, given out by the American Advertising Federation. Leo Burnett"s hijacking work in 2003 was also an MPA Kelly finalist.

Despite the success of the marketers, Polaroid continued to struggle. In July 2002 the company was bought out of bankruptcy and taken private. Polaroid simply did not have the cash it had once budgeted for advertising. According to press accounts the company was now spending about $70 million a year, less than half of the $150 million the account was estimated to be worth in 2000. When the account was put up for review in 2003, Leo Burnett opted not to participate. Euro RSCG Worldwide then took over the task of reviving the fortunes of one of the truly great brands of the second half of the twentieth century.

Elliott, Stuart. "Polaroid Hopes the Flash of a New Campaign Wins Back Its Image of Being on the Cutting Edge." New York Times, October 6, 2003, p. C5.

By 1995 Polaroid Corporation was perceived as a brand and a company whose time had passed. Disposable and 35mm cameras were less expensive than instant ones, their film was much cheaper and could be developed in an hour, and they produced better-quality photos. Polaroid sales had been declining steadily over the years, and the brand had largely faded from view. Although the company had no new products to tout, it began attempting to rebuild its brand in the United States through marketing. Polaroid tapped the San Francisco advertising agency Goodby, Silverstein & Partners to craft a campaign that would create positive buzz around the brand while reminding consumers of the unique characteristics of instant photography.

"See What Develops" ran from 1996 through 1998. The campaign leveraged an estimated annual budget of between $30 million and $35 million and included TV as well as print components. The campaign"s first series of executions specifically touted the advantages of instant photography, whereas the second installment, unveiled in 1998, focused on human behavior peculiar to the instant-photography experience. For instance, an early TV spot showed a businessman who opened his briefcase to find a surprise photo placed there by his wife as an incitement to come home for lunch, and a later TV spot gently pointed out the absurdity of consumers" insistence on shaking or blowing on Polaroid photos as though to help them develop.

The campaign was well received within the advertising industry, and it initially drove substantial sales increases in Polaroid cameras and film. Polaroid"s long-term outlook for recovering its spot atop the U.S. camera industry remained bleak, however, and 1998 saw the company post a 16 percent sales decline versus 1997.

On February 21, 1947, Edwin H. Land announced his invention of one-step photography at a meeting of the Optical Society of America. Since that time the Polaroid Corporation, Land"s company, had been synonymous with instant photography. There was an explosion of popularity in the 1970s, when instant cameras became simple to use and the shooter did not have to wait weeks for 110 or 35mm film to be developed. By the 1990s, however, instant photography was perceived as a relic of the past, and so was Polaroid.

There was a broad target audience for the "See What Develops" campaign. Polaroid wanted to reach out to current users, lapsed owners, and those who had never owned an instant camera. According to a Goodbye report, this included "men, women, parents, single adults, African Americans, Latinos and Caucasians, people in their 20s and people in their 40s." They also knew that groups such as realtors, contractors, and insurance agents used the cameras in business. Goodbye wanted to influence those users while they were away from their jobs—watching TV at home—to reinforce the need for instant pictures and Polaroid.

Increased competition from disposable and easy "point-and-shoot" 35mm cameras, along with one-hour film-processing centers, had made Polaroid"s instant photography increasingly irrelevant, and the company had lost its positioning in the market over the years. There was no perceived need to take a Polaroid picture when 35mm photography produced images that were cheaper, could be developed quickly, and had better quality.

Since 1990 the company"s retail sales had decreased approximately 3 percent a year. The public was not using Polaroids anymore. The cameras were in the backs of closets in many households. Owners used the past tense if they talked about the brand at all. According to Goodby research, people felt like ""it was state-of-the-art twenty years ago … my dad had one … we used to use it all the time for parties … it was so clunky …" And the only advertising they seemed to recall clearly for this "cultural relic" was the old James Garner and Mariette Hartley campaign from the 1970s."

In addition to the brand"s image problem, Polaroid"s chief rival, Kodak, planned to buy $108.8 million in advertising time in 1996. Polaroid"s ad budget of $33.7 million for the same period was less than a third of Kodak"s.

In 1995 Polaroid did not have a new product to release. Goodby, Silverstein & Partners and its client decided that "the advertising would have to bear the responsibility for changing perceptions and attitudes about the Polaroid brand," according to one agency report. They had three objectives—to get people thinking and talking about Polaroid, to make instant photography relevant again and reestablish the uniqueness of Polaroid, and to increase sales of Polaroid cameras and film.

Goodby consumer research indicated high negatives when Polaroid was compared to 35mm cameras and when it was perceived as an ordinary camera for taking pictures for photo albums. Those questioned repeatedly mentioned the poor quality of Polaroid pictures compared to 35mm and that the film was expensive. The ad agency knew it needed to avoid direct comparisons with other cameras. Focus-group participants were given Polaroid cameras and film, and they were asked to bring the pictures they shot to the next meeting. Goodbye wanted to discover how instant cameras could become attractive again to camera buyers. As expected, most of the returned photos were of friends, pets, and family—typical photo album pictures. But the agency discovered in the focus groups that the shots that made the price of a camera and film worth it were the shots that would not be put in albums. For example, one man reported that he had taken a picture to send to his insurance agent of his car"s damage from an accident. A woman had used the camera when she was trying on sunglasses to show her husband at home how the glasses looked on her.

The research that drove the creative team was the concept that taking a Polaroid picture was only the first step. Goodbye determined that the photo should be used as "an instant solution to a problem, an instant tool to make something happen. There should always be a purpose, the picture should always set off a chain reaction … something should always happen next." From that concept the "See What Develops" campaign was born.

The agency produced a series of print ads for magazines as diverse as People, Rolling Stone, and Time. Most of the print ads it designed were very simple, consisting of a Polaroid photo, a comment, the Polaroid logo, and the tagline "See What Develops." For instance, one ad featured a photo of the front of a business with a neon sign above it saying MOM. A letter was next to the photo on WOW Productions letterhead, addressed to the Hung-Rite Sign Company. The text simply read "You moron." The picture, the letterhead, and the logo and tagline made the point succinctly. Another print ad featured four shots of a toilet with the seat up. Below each picture was handwritten the day of the week and the time. The text read, "Honey, you always do that. No, I don"t. Yes you do. No, I don"t. Wanna bet?" followed by the logo and tagline.

Goodby did not plan an extensive integration effort in the "See What Develops" campaign. There were few direct-mail and in-store promotions. There was, however, a successful seasonal camera promotion that was publicized during the holidays in late 1996 and spring 1997 to encourage buyers of the basic One Step camera to mail in a $10 rebate form. This promotion was tied in with 15- and 30-second TV spots that ran during that time. The "See What Develops" campaign themes also were used by Polaroid"s public relations department on the company website and on a promotional van tour.

The media plan included television spots on shows such as NYPD Blue, Seinfeld, Melrose Place, and ER, which were characterized by Goodbye as "hip, high "talk-value" programming." The aim was to get people talking about Polaroid, to create some "buzz." Because Polaroid had less money to spend than Kodak, the creative team decided to employ a—that is, focus placement entirely in the 6:00 to 9:30 p.m. time slots and run the commercials for a shorter number of weeks than usual to have more impact. The strategy resulted in an average of 133 gross rating points each week for 14 weeks, according to the Competitive Media Report.

Almost $3 million in additional media time was obtained by working with the major TV networks to link upcoming shows with Polaroid and "See What Develops." For instance, a typical program teaser was "See What Develops next week on Melrose Place." Mediaweek honored Polaroid for the best media plan for a campaign spending more than $25 million.

The new television spots, while complicated visually, still conveyed the simple message that sometimes a Polaroid photo was the only thing that would work. "The Architect" was a 30-second spot that featured a group of people in a meeting, heatedly discussing solutions to a crisis. The phone rang, and a man with architectural drawings on his desk indicated to his wife on the line that he was too busy to go home for lunch. She asked him to check his briefcase. The man took out a Polaroid picture and with a delighted and surprised intake of breath, involuntarily said, "Ooohh." He then said he would be home in 10 minutes. A shot of the logo and tagline ended the commercial. The image he saw was left to the viewer"s imagination. In "Dog and Cat," another 30-second spot, there were quick shots of a spilled kitchen trash can, a woman scolding a dog as a cat looked on, the dog later watching as the cat approached the trash container, the dog thinking back to the scolding, then picturing his options—a rolling pin, a cleaver, a Polaroid camera. Cut to the logo and tagline. The dog, with a picture in its mouth of the cat in the trash, then greeted the owner at the door, who said, "Oh, dear."

As the campaign matured, Polaroid and Goodby focused on documenting humorous Polaroid-influenced human behavior rather than on explicitly pointing out situations in which instant cameras might be necessary. For instance, in 1998 one documentary-style spot focused on three different adults at a party, each of whom detailed the trademark poses that he or she relied on when instant photos were taken at such events. Another spot poked fun at the unnecessary rituals, such as blowing and shaking the photo, that Polaroid users frequently engaged in as a way of "helping" the image emerge. The season"s third TV spot focused on the embarrassment that an otherwise dignified bank manager felt about a Polaroid taken of him at a party.

Campaign objectives were initially met and exceeded. Three months after the release of "See What Develops," a tracking study showed that there was a "buzz" about Polaroid. Goodbye cited tracking study data when it explained, "unaided brand awareness among ou[r] 18-49-year-old target increased from 31 to 39 percent. Unaided ad awareness rose from 11 percent to 22 percent."

The campaign also got attention from publications besides the advertising press—"something Polaroid"s advertising hasn"t gotten since the days of the well-liked Garner-Hartley campaign," one Goodbye report stated. The report cited articles in Newsweek, USA Today, Time, and the Los Angeles Times Magazine and added that one of the print ads had been talked about by Tom Snyder on the Late Late Show.

The objective of redefining the relevancy and uniqueness of Polaroid instant photography was also exceeded in the early stages of the campaign. Prelaunch Goodby and Polaroid qualitative research in 1995 and 1996 had found that focus-group members who had negative attitudes about Polaroid before the meeting would leave the session feeling enthusiastic after having viewed the campaign. Goodbye reported that the group members said that "they now wanted to buy a Polaroid camera, how they saw all these new ways of using it, how it could still do things no other camera could do." According to the ad agency, copy tests had revealed that 60 percent of Polaroid owners said that they would buy film after seeing the spots, versus 30 percent for the control group.

The qualitative research done before the campaign began was proven correct. The tracking study determined that consumer intent to purchase a Polaroid camera rose from 9 percent before the campaign to 13 percent three months later. Goodbye explained, "we had given consumers a new way of looking at "old Polaroid," and it made them reconsider buying Polaroid cameras and film."

The objective of increasing Polaroid camera and film sales was also met. Partial year A.C. Nielsen data for 1996 indicated that camera sales increased by 13 percent. Film sales, which had been declining 3 percent a year for a long time, increased 1 percent—a turnaround of 4 percent.

In addition to the Mediaweek award, Goodbye and Polaroid received a Silver EFFIE. Polaroid"s long-term prospects, however, failed to improve significantly after the campaign"s initial effects wore off. "See What Develops" continued to win accolades within the advertising industry, but Polaroid"s total sales for 1998 declined 16 percent, dropping to $1.8 billion from a 1997 total of $2.1 billion.

In 1999, although Goodbye had unveiled a new theme, "Right Now," for its Polaroid branding work, the company abruptly pulled that tag, reportedly in response to high-level executives" displeasure about the fact that the same slogan had been used on behalf of a Pepsi product a few years earlier. "See What Develops" was thus resurrected to serve as the tagline for a set of three TV spots that ran in the spring and summer of that year. In the fall of 1999 Polaroid introduced a line of products already popular in Japan and China rather than any that had been developed specifically for the United States, a move that some analysts considered a desperate tactic to spur growth by any means necessary. These products—a pocket-sized camera that produced passport-sized instant photos with adhesive backs and a disposable instant camera—were marketed in the United States as the Polaroid I-Zone line and targeted a previously untapped market of 6- to 17-year-olds. A Goodbye-helmed I-Zone launch campaign resulted in fourth-quarter sales gains of 20 percent, boosting Polaroid"s total 1999 sales by 7 percent, to $1.97 billion.

In 2000, however, Polaroid reshuffled its advertising duties to reflect its need for global rather than U.S.-specific marketing platforms, awarding the U.S. account to Chicago"s Leo Burnett, an affiliate of Polaroid"s European agency Bartle Bogle Hegarty of London and of the Japanese agency Dentsu, which had been simultaneously enlisted to take over the brand"s advertising in that country. This reorganization did little to forestall the continued decline of Polaroid"s fortunes. Yet another photographic innovation, the digital camera, was becoming increasingly popular among consumers, and its numerous advantages over previous technologies included precisely the capability to offer instant gratification that had been Polaroid"s chief marketable advantage over other camera brands. Polaroid filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on October 12, 2000.

I cant give any specific comments on it cause I ain"t got my OHp yet, but will let you know how I get on. I always make sure, for waht I buy from now, that an item has all of its original accesories. I got my polaview 3000 for £115, about $170, but got the case, manual, remote, vga cable, mouse cable and power supply.