new lcd panel ahs ability to record you made in china

This is turning into something of a series, but following on from my postings on the state of the LCD TV panel market in Japan and Korea, now it"s time to take a look at what"s going on in one of the world"s biggest markets for LCD TVs – and just about everything –, China.

Although the recent tough times have led to both the Korean giants, LG and Samsung, delaying their plans to open LCD plants in China – and rumours in China suggest this may lead to a shelving of such plans –, the Chinese LCD panel business is booming.

In the first quarter of this year China overtook Japan as an LCD panel manufacturing country. It"s still behind the true giants of the industry, South Korea and Taiwan, but as they say, it"s working on that.

The biggest Chinese TV manufacturers, BOE Technology Group and TCL Group, have recently started operations at their own large-panel LCD panel plants, and plan to boost production further, meaning that LCD production in China next year will be double this year"s level.

And although there"s a common misconception that the emerging Chinese market is only buying basic flatpanel TVs to replace old CRT TVs, or simply bring TV to more households, in fact Chinese companies are keeping pace with their Japanese and Korean neighbours when it comes to rolling out new technology.

Yes, government incentives may have seen explosive growth of 30% in the Chinese flatscreen TV market last year, so far this year there has been much slower growth. To lure more customers in, Chinese manufacturers are turning to innovative technologies.

Last year Hisense became the first company in China to launch a full-LED-lit 3D TV, and is also introducing "smart" internet-connected sets. This year – in fact, in the past few weeks - it has rolled out what it calls "The world"s first personalised smart TV", in the form of its I"TV model.

It"s a different take on the tablet device concept, in which TV capability is firmly to the fore, with a range of features including the ability to stream either live broadcasts or recorded content from the home TV to the I"TV or a smartphone.

Along with internet and gaming capability, that"s all made possible by the spread of technical expertise within the company: as it says, "Development of I"TV depended on efforts of a number of in-house researchers, with Hisense Electric as the general designer, Hisense Media Networks as the developer of the support platform and application store, Hisense Communication as the developer of the software operating system and Hisense Broadband Multimedia Technology as the developer of the multi-screen interactivity.

"Thanks to the in-house industrial ecological chain through a collaboration across multiple divisions and cross-sector cooperative development, Hisense was able to build technology clusters based on a combination of system software, cloud computing, internet applications, artificial intelligence, industrial design and operational services and complete development of the personalised smart TV in a short time."

Hisense chairman Zhou Houjian – that"s him above, with the I"TV – says that "The new product, a result of "micro innovation and major revolution", brings to fruition my childhood dream and is the revolutionary product that I have waited a lifetime to produce."

He expects the concept to be something of a "game-changer" in the Chinese TV market, making the home TV nothing more than a "terminal" for a whole range of similar personal devices able to stream TV from it using cloud computing facilities.

Meanwhile, the boom in LCD panel production capacity in China, and the slowing domestic demand for TVs, threatens to further exacerbate the global oversupply in the market.

While Japanese companies such as Tokyo Electron and Asahi Glass already have plants in China, to date most Chinese manufacturers are concentrating on TV-size panels, which are simpler to manufacture than the smaller panels used, for example, on tablet devices and smartphones.

However, although BOE and TCL have only just started making large-screen displays, both have plans to switch some production to the smaller, more intricate panels for handheld devices. And that acquisition of knowledge and capability will pose a threat to technology the Japanese and Korean companies have taken many years to develop.

BOE Technology Group and TCL China Star Optoelectronics Technology (TCL CSOT) are among the Chinese panel makers to have ramped up output since around 2019 with generous state subsidies. China is gaining on South Korea, whose share of capacity is seen reaching 55% for 2022 in an October estimate by U.S. market intelligence firm Display Supply Chain Consultants (DSCC).

SEOUL (Reuters) - Samsung Electronics’ display unit has received licenses from U.S. authorities to continue supplying certain display panel products to Huawei Technologies [HWT.UL], a source familiar with the matter told Reuters on Tuesday.

With U.S.-China ties at their worst in decades, Washington has been pushing governments around the world to squeeze out Huawei, arguing that the telecom giant would hand data to the Chinese government for spying. Huawei denies it spies for China.

Samsung Display, which counts Samsung Electronics and Apple as major customers for organic light-emitting diode (OLED) display screens, declined comment.

It is still unclear whether Samsung Display will be able to export its OLED panels to Huawei as other firms in the supply chain making components necessary to manufacture panels would also have to get U.S. licences.

Samsung’s cross-town rival LG Display said on Thursday that it and other companies, including most semiconductor companies, need to get licences to resume business with Huawei.

Flat-panel displays are thin panels of glass or plastic used for electronically displaying text, images, or video. Liquid crystal displays (LCD), OLED (organic light emitting diode) and microLED displays are not quite the same; since LCD uses a liquid crystal that reacts to an electric current blocking light or allowing it to pass through the panel, whereas OLED/microLED displays consist of electroluminescent organic/inorganic materials that generate light when a current is passed through the material. LCD, OLED and microLED displays are driven using LTPS, IGZO, LTPO, and A-Si TFT transistor technologies as their backplane using ITO to supply current to the transistors and in turn to the liquid crystal or electroluminescent material. Segment and passive OLED and LCD displays do not use a backplane but use indium tin oxide (ITO), a transparent conductive material, to pass current to the electroluminescent material or liquid crystal. In LCDs, there is an even layer of liquid crystal throughout the panel whereas an OLED display has the electroluminescent material only where it is meant to light up. OLEDs, LCDs and microLEDs can be made flexible and transparent, but LCDs require a backlight because they cannot emit light on their own like OLEDs and microLEDs.

Liquid-crystal display (or LCD) is a thin, flat panel used for electronically displaying information such as text, images, and moving pictures. They are usually made of glass but they can also be made out of plastic. Some manufacturers make transparent LCD panels and special sequential color segment LCDs that have higher than usual refresh rates and an RGB backlight. The backlight is synchronized with the display so that the colors will show up as needed. The list of LCD manufacturers:

Organic light emitting diode (or OLED displays) is a thin, flat panel made of glass or plastic used for electronically displaying information such as text, images, and moving pictures. OLED panels can also take the shape of a light panel, where red, green and blue light emitting materials are stacked to create a white light panel. OLED displays can also be made transparent and/or flexible and these transparent panels are available on the market and are widely used in smartphones with under-display optical fingerprint sensors. LCD and OLED displays are available in different shapes, the most prominent of which is a circular display, which is used in smartwatches. The list of OLED display manufacturers:

MicroLED displays is an emerging flat-panel display technology consisting of arrays of microscopic LEDs forming the individual pixel elements. Like OLED, microLED offers infinite contrast ratio, but unlike OLED, microLED is immune to screen burn-in, and consumes less power while having higher light output, as it uses LEDs instead of organic electroluminescent materials, The list of MicroLED display manufacturers:

LCDs are made in a glass substrate. For OLED, the substrate can also be plastic. The size of the substrates are specified in generations, with each generation using a larger substrate. For example, a 4th generation substrate is larger in size than a 3rd generation substrate. A larger substrate allows for more panels to be cut from a single substrate, or for larger panels to be made, akin to increasing wafer sizes in the semiconductor industry.

2015, sold to giantplus and tce photomasks, gen 3 still operated by giantplus, gen 4 line sold to giantplus, equipment sold and line demolished, remainder operated by tce

"Samsung Display has halted local Gen-8 LCD lines: sources". THE ELEC, Korea Electronics Industry Media. August 16, 2019. Archived from the original on April 3, 2020. Retrieved December 18, 2019.

"TCL to Build World"s Largest Gen 11 LCD Panel Factory". www.businesswire.com. May 19, 2016. Archived from the original on April 2, 2018. Retrieved April 1, 2018.

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"TCL"s Panel Manufacturer CSOT Commences Production of High Generation Panel Modules". www.businesswire.com. June 14, 2018. Archived from the original on June 30, 2019. Retrieved June 30, 2019.

"Samsung Display Considering Halting Some LCD Production Lines". 비즈니스코리아 - BusinessKorea. August 16, 2019. Archived from the original on April 5, 2020. Retrieved December 19, 2019.

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Facial recognition supporters in the US often argue that the surveillance technology is reserved for the greatest risks -- to help deal with violent crimes, terrorist threats and human trafficking. And while it"s still often used for petty crimes like shoplifting, stealing $12 worth of goods or selling $50 worth of drugs, its use in the US still looks tame compared with how widely deployed facial recognition has been in China.

China"s facial recognition system logs nearly every single citizen in the country, with a vast network of cameras across the country. A database leak in 2019 gave a glimpse of how pervasive China"s surveillance tools are -- with more than 6.8 million records from a single day, taken from cameras positioned around hotels, parks, tourism spots and mosques, logging details on people as young as 9 days old.

The Chinese government is accused of using facial recognition to commit atrocities against Uyghur Muslims, relying on the technology to carry out "the largest mass incarceration of a minority population in the world today."

"China uses facial recognition to profile Uyghur individuals, classify them on the basis of their ethnicity, and single them out for tracking, mistreatment, and detention," a bipartisan group of 17 senators said in a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on March 11. "And these technologies are deployed in service of a dystopian vision for technology governance, that harnesses the economic benefits of the internet in the absence of political freedom and sees technology companies as instruments of state power."

China"s aggressive development and use of facial recognition offers a window into how a technology that can be both benign and beneficial -- think your iPhone"s Face ID -- can also be twisted to enable a crackdown on actions that the average person may not even consider a crime. Chinese officials have used surveillance tools to publicly shame people wearing sleepwear in public, calling it "uncivilized behavior."

The punishing of these minor offenses is by design, surveillance experts said. The threat of public humiliation through facial recognition helps Chinese officials direct over a billion people toward what it considers acceptable behavior, from what you wear to how you cross the street.

"The idea is that the authorities are trying to put in place comprehensive surveillance and behavioral engineering on a mass scale," said Maya Wang, a senior researcher on China at the Human Rights Watch. "The authorities want to create a kind of society that would be very easy for them to manage."

The idea that China"s facial recognition would automatically put your name and photo on a billboard for jaywalking and privately text you a fine instills fear in people to behave a certain way, Wang said.

In the US, behavioral engineering can be done through amassing data on people, and pushing or excluding content to them based on predicted personality traits.

Facebook"s 2018 scandal with Cambridge Analytica stemmed from the fact that the now-defunct UK data analytics firm used data from millions of people to target advertising that would sway people to vote a certain way.

Russia"s 2016 US election meddling efforts involved using Facebook to create divisive groups and stage events where people would show up to protest. These posts would be targeted to police groups or specifically to Spanish speakers, for example.

"It conditions the idea of "this is how society works," that you"re always being watched," said Jake Laperruque, a senior counsel at the Constitution Project. "It seems like trying to reinforce to people that "we"re watching all the time, if you ever do anything to piss us off, we will see and we will find a way to embarrass you.""

Cameras set up at crosswalks to identify and post photos of jaywalkers are commonplace, and a report from Abacus in May 2019 showed photos of children jaywalking on a digital billboard. The local traffic police said "children should be treated the same as adults," according to the outlet.

And while in the US, facial recognition is going through a reckoning over its racial bias and human rights concerns, in China, the surveillance technology"s providers boast its abilities to single out people of different ethnicities."There"s no allowed space at all, both online and offline, to discuss racial bias and the persecution of minorities in China."

Last November, IPVM found that Chinese surveillance company Hikvision marketed that its cameras could automatically identify Uyghur Muslims with its facial recognition.

There"s pushback on facial recognition in the US because researchers are able to bring to light their concerns about the technology"s racial bias, but there isn"t similar scrutiny in China, researchers said.

"Americans can talk about racial inequalities without fear," the Human Rights Watch"s Wang said. "These systems are not discussed or pushed back in China. There"s no allowed space at all, both online and offline, to discuss racial bias and the persecution of minorities in China."

China"s model of facial recognition, from its oppressive surveillance of Uyghur Muslims to its every day grip over a population of 1.4 billion people, also poses a concern for the international community, US lawmakers said.

Last September, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that China was a major supplier of AI surveillance, providing the technology to 63 countries.The next closest provider for AI surveillance tech was Japan"s NEC Corporation, which sells facial recognition to 14 countries.

In April, Reuters reported that Amazon bought cameras from Dahua, a Chinese surveillance company blacklisted by the US over allegations that it helps China detain and monitor Uyghur Muslims.

In the senators" letter on March 11, they raised issues about China"s influence on how facial recognition should be used when it"s the technology"s top exporter.

Wang noted that while facial recognition is often a subsidiary for US tech giants, like Amazon"s Rekognition or Microsoft, in China, there are multiple companies already dominating the industry. The country"s acceptance of a surveillance state allows facial recognition providers to push forward with the technology, even for the most trivial uses.

With that level of influence, there"re concerns that China"s model of how to use facial recognition -- a widespread network designed for public shaming and control -- could spread to the rest of the world.

"Unfortunately, China has indicated a willingness to use standard setting bodies in perverse ways to normalize global opinions about Orwellian surveillance technology," the group of lawmakers said. "By shaping the debate about the legitimate uses of artificial intelligence and facial recognition, China can expand opportunities for countries, particularly those in the developing world, to utilize Chinese surveillance technology."

12MP 2x Telephoto (enabled by quad-pixel sensor): 48 mm, ƒ/1.78 aperture, second-generation sensor-shift optical image stabilization, seven‑element lens, 100% Focus Pixels

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As part of our efforts to reach carbon neutrality by 2030, iPhone 14 Pro and iPhone 14 Pro Max do not include a power adapter or EarPods. Included in the box is a USB‑C to Lightning Cable that supports fast charging and is compatible with USB‑C power adapters and computer ports.

We encourage you to re‑use your current USB‑A to Lightning cables, power adapters, and headphones, which are compatible with these iPhone models. But if you need any new Apple power adapters or headphones, they are available for purchase.

We’re committed to making our products without taking from the earth, and to become carbon neutral across our entire business, including products, by 2030.

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Testing conducted by Apple in August 2022 using preproduction iPhone 14, iPhone 14 Plus, iPhone 14 Pro, and iPhone 14 Pro Max units and software and accessory Apple USB‑C Power Adapter (20W Model A2305). Fast‑charge testing conducted with drained iPhone units. Charge time varies with settings and environmental factors; actual results will vary.

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Part of the public anger stems from the fact that these measures no longer seem to work. The rise of the Omicron variant and other highly transmissible variants has made stamping out every case of the virus costly and futile. Locking down a city of over 200,000 because of a single case is no longer an effective way to fight Covid-19. Relatively low rates of vaccination among older people, paired with China’s insistence on using less effective, domestically manufactured vaccines, have left the country with little immunity.Questions about the pandemic

When will the pandemic end?We asked three experts — two immunologists and an epidemiologist — to weigh in on this and some of the hundreds of other questions we’ve gathered from readers recently, including how to make sense of booster and test timing, recommendations for children, whether getting covid is just inevitable and other pressing queries.

How concerning are things like long covid and reinfections?That’s a difficult question to answer definitely, writes the Opinion columnist Zeynep Tufekci, because of the lack of adequate research and support for sufferers, as well as confusion about what the condition even is. She has suggestions for how to approach the problem. Regarding another ongoing Covid danger, that of reinfections, a virologist sets the record straight: “There has yet to be a variant that negates the benefits of vaccines.”

How will the virus continue to change?As a group of scientists who study viruses explains, “There’s no reason, at least biologically, that the virus won’t continue to evolve.” From a different angle, the science writer David Quammen surveys some of the highly effective tools and techniques that are now available for studying Covid and other viruses, but notes that such knowledge alone won’t blunt the danger.

What could endemic Covid look like?David Wallace Wells writes that by one estimate, 100,000 Americans could die each yearfrom the coronavirus. Stopping that will require a creative effort to increase and sustain high levels of vaccination. The immunobiologist Akiko Iwasaki writes that new vaccines, particular those delivered through the nose, may be part of the answer.

The very policies that allowed China to roar back to life in 2020 and 2021, when most other countries remained largely closed, have now left China as the only major economy in the world that is still experiencing regular lockdowns. The zero Covid policy has become so intertwined with Mr. Xi’s rule that overzealous local officials have carried it out even when doing so makes little sense. A deadly apartment fire in a city that had been under lockdown for 100 days set off the current wave of protests, but frustration has been building for months. Viral posts about people who were prevented from leaving their homes despite an earthquake outraged the public. So did news of the death of a 3-year-old boy who had been poisoned by carbon monoxide during a lockdown but was initially prevented from being taken to the hospital because of Covid protocols.

The pandemic has laid bare the vulnerabilities of every society in the world, and China is no exception. Lynette Ong, the author of a new book on China’s communist system, “Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China,” says the protests may be hastening the demise of a system that the Chinese Communist Party has relied on for years, using local party volunteers to implement government policies in their own neighborhoods. These volunteers have been empowered to enforce lockdowns and quarantines and have “had to increasingly deploy unreasonable and extreme measures to extract compliance from citizens, which invited further backlash,” she wrote in Foreign Policy magazine.

The World Cup also seems to have played a role in the public’s frustration. Some Chinese people described seeing maskless soccer fans on television as the moment they realized that much of the rest of the world has moved beyond Covid while China remains mired in the battle against it.

Shanghai, China’s most populous city, endured an epic lockdown this past spring. Residents of the city were reportedly told to prepare for four days in their apartments. In the end, they were holed up for more than 60. Some went hungry as food stocks ran out and government aid arrived absurdly late. In the meantime, people sang and screamed out their apartment windows to protest their confinement, only to be met by flying drones blaring orders through their windows. “Control your soul’s desire for freedom,” one drone told them.

It was supposed to build cutting-edge flat-panel display screens for TVs and other devices and instantly establish Wisconsin as a destination for tech firms.

But industry executives, including some at Foxconn, were highly skeptical of the plan from the start, pointing out that none of the crucial suppliers needed for flat-panel display production were located anywhere near Wisconsin.

The plan faced local opposition too, with critics denouncing a taxpayer giveaway to a foreign company and provisions of the deal that granted extensive water rights and allowed for the acquisition and demolition of houses through eminent domain.

As of 2019, the village where the plant is located had paid just over $152 million for 132 properties to make way for Foxconn, plus $7.9 million in relocation costs, according to village records obtained by Wisconsin Public Radio and analyzed by Wisconsin Watch.

Foxconn, formally called Hon Hai Precision, said the new agreement gives it "flexibility to pursue business opportunities in response to changing global market conditions." The company said: "Original projections used during negotiations in 2017 have at this time changed due to unanticipated market fluctuations."

After abandoning its plans for advanced displays, Foxconn later said it would build smaller, earlier-generation displays in Wisconsin, but that plan never came to fruition either.

Prior to Tuesday"s announcement, Foxconn Chairman Liu Young-way told reporters in Taipei that the company currently makes servers, communications technology products and medical devices in Wisconsin, adding that electric vehicles (EVs) have a "promising future" there. He did not elaborate.

Liu had previously said the infrastructure was there in Wisconsin to make EVs because of its proximity to the traditional heartland of U.S. automaking, but the company also could decide on Mexico.

All nationals of The People’s Republic of China holding valid 10-year B1/B2, B1 or B2 visas who travel to the United States on a passport issued by the People’s Republic of China must comply with EVUS requirements beginning on November 29, 2016.

Yes. A friend, relative, travel industry professional, or another third party may submit the required information to EVUS on your behalf.  You are responsible for the truthfulness and accuracy of all information submitted on your behalf.

A friend, relative, travel industry professional, or another third party may submit the required information to EVUS on your behalf.  Additional information is also available on CBP’s informational EVUS website at www.cbp.gov/evus. If an applicant has questions about how to fill out the application or issues with the EVUS site, they can contact the EVUS Call Center at 00-1-202-325-0180. The Call Center is available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, but is closed on U.S. federal holidays. The Call Center is staffed with Mandarin speakers. You may also contact the Call Center by email at evus@cbp.dhs.gov.  The Call Center is available to answer questions travelers might have regarding EVUS, but all EVUS enrollments must be submitted online by the traveler or a third party. U.S. Embassies and Consulates are not able to provide details about EVUS enrollments or resolve the issue that caused an unsuccessful enrollment.

The vast majority of EVUS enrollments will be processed within minutes; however, it may take up to 72 hours. CBP recommends enrolling in EVUS well in advance of your planned travel.

An unsuccessful enrollment may be due to an administrative error, such as failure to provide complete information on the EVUS form.  For assistance, please see the CBP informational website at www.cbp.gov/evus or call the EVUS Call Center at 00-1-202-325-0180. The Call Center is available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, but is closed on U.S. federal holidays. The Call Center is staffed with Mandarin speakers. You may also contact the Call Center by email at evus@cbp.dhs.gov. The Call Center is available to answer questions travelers might have regarding EVUS, but all EVUS enrollments must be submitted online by the traveler or a third party.  U.S. Embassies and Consulates are not able to provide details about EVUS enrollments or resolve the issue that caused an unsuccessful enrollment.

An unsuccessful enrollment may result from a system generated or an inputting error by the enrollee such as failure to provide complete or accurate information. A traveler who receives an “Unsuccessful Enrollment” message should contact the EVUS Call Center at 00-1-202-325-0180 or via email at evus@cbp.dhs.gov before attempting to re-enroll. The Call Center is available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, but is closed on U.S. federal holidays. The Call Center is staffed with Mandarin speaking operators and is available to answer questions travelers might have regarding EVUS. All EVUS enrollments must be submitted online by the traveler or a third party.  U.S. Embassies and Consulates are not able to provide details about EVUS enrollments or resolve the issue that caused an unsuccessful enrollment.

Expedited enrollments are not possible.  U.S. Embassies and Consulates are not able to facilitate EVUS enrollments, provide details about EVUS enrollments, or resolve unsuccessful enrollments.

No. We anticipate that the vast majority of EVUS enrollments will be processed and approved within minutes. EVUS is designed to update a traveler’s biographic and admissibility information on a periodic basis (every two years, or after obtaining a new passport and/or maximum validity (10-year) U.S. visa).

Travelers will be able to read the questions on the EVUS form in Mandarin Chinese.  If a traveler is unable to provide answers to the questions in English, they may wish to seek assistance from third parties, such as a trusted friend, family member or travel agent, to complete the form in English on the traveler’s behalf.  Third parties will also be able to review completed applications or approved applications. The traveler is responsible for the truthfulness and accuracy of all information submitted on his or her behalf.

Airlines receive EVUS enrollment information through their internal networks.  On November 29, 2016, airlines may not provide a boarding pass to a traveler who has a maximum validity (10-year) B1/B2, B1 or B2 visa in a People’s Republic of China-issued passport who does not have a valid EVUS enrollment recorded in their system.

The Call Center provides assistance at no charge, other than any fees or charges your phone provider may require in order for you to contact the EVUS Call Center number.  The EVUS Call Center number is based in Washington, DC, USA. The EVUS Call Center also provides assistance by email at evus@cbp.dhs.gov.

Anyone from these regions traveling on a Peoples Republic of China passport with a 10-year B1/B2, B1 or B2 visa will be required to enroll in EVUS.  Travelers using other travel documents, including Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, and Taiwan passports may continue to travel to the U.S. as they currently do.

Anyone traveling on a Peoples Republic of China passport with a 10-year B1/B2, B1 or B2 visa will be required to enroll in EVUS, regardless of current residence.

An information update is referred to as an enrollment.  Enrollments generally last for two years or when the traveler’s visa or passport expires, whichever comes first. Chinese holders of 10-year  B1/B2, B1 or B2 visas will need to update their information before they intend to travel to the United States (if a two-year enrollment has expired), or when they get a new passport.

Yes. The website is operated by the U.S. government and employs technology to prevent unauthorized access to the information entered and viewed.  Information submitted by travelers through the EVUS website is subject to the same strict controls that have been established for similar traveler screening programs as governed by U.S. laws and regulations.

No. EVUS will not require the traveler to submit a photograph or fingerprints. This update will require the traveler to answer a series of questions about himself/herself, and his/her job, background and travel history/destination.

Yes. Third parties will be able to check the EVUS status for individual travelers and for an entire group of travelers.  Third parties will also be able to review completed applications, update unpaid or approved applications, submit payment for applicants, and view payment receipts. The traveler is responsible for the truthfulness and accuracy of all information submitted on his or her behalf.

All major browsers are supported. Please verify the release of the browser is the most up to date, is able to accept cookies, and has JavaScript enabled.

The minimum computer configuration requirement for enrolling for EVUS is an internet browser that supports 128-bit encryption and is able to accept cookies, and has JavaScript enabled.

If your computer meets the minimum configuration requirements and you are still having technical problems, then this could be a web browser or fire wall problem. Check your internet security settings - if they are set too high, they may be blocking access to the EVUS web site. If that doesn"t work try enrolling from another browser/computer. Finally, some ISPs may be blocked due to spam concerns, and you may have to contact your local internet service provider (ISP) for assistance.

If the system will not let you go to the next page, the system may have found an error in a required field (such as an invalid Character, skipped a field, etc.) You will not be allowed to continue until these errors have been corrected. If a mandatory field (indicated by a red *) is not filled in properly, the system will continually return you to the current page.

If your computer freezes up and will not let you continue, the problem is most likely with your browser or your computer capacity. You may need to use a different computer.

If you are still having technical problems, please click on EVUS Call Center link at the bottom of the page and submit a help request. You are required to have an email address for us to respond to. If you do not, ask someone who does to help you. Be sure to describe exactly what is happening (in English), and tell us what internet browser you are using and its version.

Since 1945, US global leadership has defended international law and protected the democratic order.National Security Strategy, is prioritizing its military strategy, weapons systems, and defense acquisition planning toward the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific Command’s (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility is the focus of the US military in the twenty-first century.

US military power is based on the deterrence policy of punishment and denial.Punishment, according to John Mearsheimer, involves threatening to destroy an adversary’s infrastructure, whiledenialconvinces an opponent that military objectives will not be achieved.Deterrence by punishment, thus works with an adversary’s fear of massive retaliation, whereas, deterrence by denial focuses on showing how an adversary’s endgame will not be achieved through strengthened integrated weapon systems, joint warfare, and precision offensive firepower. Deterrence transfers higher risk and imposes costs on China, while lowering risks to the United States. According to Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, the US engagement has brought stability in strategic theaters.

The United States enjoys overwhelming advantages over China. The United States outweighs China in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), technology, and military spending. China’s GDP is 15 percent of global GDP, compared to 24 percent of the United States.command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(C4ISR) and air, surface, and undersea weapon systems. The United States has spent $19 trillion on its military since the end of the Cold War. This spending is $16 trillion more than China spent and nearly as much as the rest of the world’s combined expenditure during the same period.

Iraq’s fourth-largest military in the world was decimated by the United States during the First Gulf War. Airpower played a major role, while there was diminutive fighting between the US and Iraqi armies. Then what? China studied the First Gulf War to understand modern warfare. In a full-scale war, China would be decimated by the nuclear and conventionally superior US military. China has not dealt with any external crisis, nor has fought full-scale wars in modern history. A technological gap exists between the United States and China. They definitely are not in the same league.

The USN’s merging of weapon systems and C4ISR systems with multi-domain network and integrated ship defenses is more lethal than the numbers of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines and warships. The PLAN consists of 63 warships over 3,000 tons with a total tonnage of 447,000 tons, while the USN has 120 warships with a total of 2 million tons.

The USN and PLAN have an equal number of submarines. However, the USN’s technologically advanced fleet weighs 730,000 tons, which is three times that of the PLAN.Virginia-class ballistic missile submarine, has a contract that includes 11 submarines and will triple the class’s Tomahawk cruise missile capacity to 40 missiles per submarine.

The USN is inducting 10 high-tech DDG 51 Flight III destroyers, equipped with new technologies such as more power for laser weapons, newer engines, improved electronicsand the advanced SPY-6 radar. A total of 20 DDG 51 class ships are under contract at US shipyards.The United States is constructing the new Flight IIA DDG 51s, which will be equipped with the next-generationradar technology, Aegis Baseline 9 Combat System, BMD, andantiship cruise missilescapabilities. The Flight IIA and III have 96 missile tubes equipped with SM-2,SM-6, and the Tomahawk cruise missile.

The network of US international partnerships has fostered security, promoted stability and prevented conflicts. In the Indo-Pacific region, the US forward military presence and cooperation with its regional partners is a deterrence for China.

The United States leads NATO and simultaneously provides a defense umbrella to Japan and South Korea. The United States has 29,500 troops deployed in South Korea and another 45,000 troops in Japan.

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Major General Zhang Shaozhong ranked Chinese military power in 2020 in the fifth place behind the United States, Russia, Britain, and France, while PLAN surface power was ranked in the eighth place behind Japan and India. The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was ranked seventh in the world, due to its lack of fourth-generation fighter planes and high-end drones. In General Shaozhong’s view, China will become the second-largest military power in the world only in 2049, when it celebrates its centennial anniversary.

The US military plays the central role of economic deterrence. The Communist Party of China (CCP) gains its legitimacy from economic development. It is possible that China could target Guam with its small fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). However, the use of ICBMs will lead to massive retaliatory strikes by the United States leading to total annihilation of China’s military and economic centers of gravity.Cruise Missile Block V will destroy coastal cities like Shanghai, obliterating China’s hi-tech industries in a matter of hours.

The CCP leadership is inexperienced in nuclear matters as it lacks exposure to a nuclear warfare strategy as practiced by the United States and Russia. China’s nuclear policy is based on low-level deterrence, “minimum deterrence,” and its nuclear arsenal remains small and vulnerable.

A war will lead to a loss of China’s exports to the United States worthUSD 310 billion. The war willresult in a decline in industrial production, unemployment, and inflation, causing an economic crash and a people’s revolution. As seen from World War II, the United States will experience reverse economic gains and benefit from the war, resulting in high employment and industrial growth.

It is expensive to be a superpower. Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War two and a half millennia ago, “first count the cost.”The United States alone spends more on national defense than China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil combined.Can China afford it? An arms race will lead to an increase in China’s military spending, affecting its development goals.

The PLA strategy is based on Mao’s theory of the weak contender fighting a stronger adversary through deceit and deception. China’s only option is an asymmetric strategy due to its incapability to fight symmetric wars. Chinese scholars have authored books like Science of Military Campaigns, Science of Military Strategy, and Unrestricted Warfare.

Power projection capabilities set a superpower apart. From its Charm Offensive to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been wielding its economic power to compel US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to align with China, which has not been greatly successful.

China is constrained to operate beyond the unrefueled range of its aircraft, warships, and submarines. US nuclear-powered carriers can rule the seas for four years before being refueled. China’s nonnuclear-powered AC can barely operate beyond its green waters. The Type 903 replenishment ship can only support two to three ships for approximately two weeks.

Fighter aircraft operating without a package of air-refueling tankers, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, or a network of expeditionary airfields cannot travel very far. The PLAAF’s capability to target US bases in the Pacific is hindered by a lack of air-refueling capacity. A flight group of eight J-11BFlankers will have to be simultaneously refueled twice by two air-refueling tankers for a seven-hour flight.

China’s only existing bomber, the H-6K, is reverse engineered from the 1950s Soviet-designed Tu-16 bomber. The bomber is incapable of attacking Hawaii—even when equipped with CJ-10 cruise missiles. The H-6K has a range of 3,800 miles, while Hawaii is 5,157 miles from the closest H-6K base. The H-6K cannot attack nearby US bases, as the bomber will be detected on open seas by the US C4ISR systems. PLAAF fighters are unable to escort the bombers, as they cannot match its range.

The PLA’s loyalty to the CCP has hampered its competence..PLAAF pilots fall short on the requirement of executing sophisticated aerial maneuvers during unplanned operations.

China’s military structure presents significant cultural challenges,The USN values autonomy from the individual to the institution, which reflects its emphasis on commanding at sea.

PLAN submarines have the worst safety record in the world.The PLAN submarine power is outdated, compared to the overwhelming USN undersea warfare capabilities. The US submarine arm brings strategic deterrence to the Indo-Pacific through a wide array of capabilities such as antisubmarine warfare antisurface warfare precision land strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and special warfare capabilities.

Soviet weapon systems were much sought after by the United States to learn their strengths and weaknesses. Numerous Soviet-made fighter aircraft defected during the Cold War. An Iraqi MiG 21 defected to Israel, while a Soviet MiG 25 landed in Japan. The aircraft were later handed over to the United States to decipher the technical details. However, US intelligence is not similarly orchestrating any defections of PLAAF fighter aircraft, as the United States is not interested in obsolete Chinese technology. Instead, China is stealing weapon data or reverse engineering US weapon systems.

The US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter entered service in 1983 and saw combat during the First Gulf War, while the fifth-generation F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning fighter aircraft have been deployed in conflict zones. However, the PLAAF has not operationally inducted the J-31 fighter aircraft while the J-20 fighter aircraft has not yet proven its capabilities in any bilateral or multilateral military exercise. The much-hyped Chengdu J-20 is a heavy fighter aircraft comparable to the MiG 31, which is essentially an interceptor and not a multirole or an air superiority aircraft.

A study of modern wars suggests that the United States will decimate China’s military without entering the A2/AD zone. This is how the United States devastated Iraqi defenses in 1990. US strategic depth in Asia will allow military planners to concentrate the military at different locations.

The United States has a devastating array of lethal weapon systems, such as submarines, for countering China’s A2/AD strategies. During the First Gulf War, the United States launched 297 Tomahawks, which destroyed the Iraqi military.Ohio-class submarines can operate unhindered in the adversary’s A2/AD zone closer to the shore; thus, striking targets far inland.Collectively, four Ohio-class submarines installed with 616 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles would obliterate China’s military. The inexperienced PLAN AC group will be destroyed by long-range antiship missiles (LRASM), Tomahawks, and Mark 48-Mod 7 torpedoes launched from USSKeyWest, USS Oklahoma City, USS Topeka, and USS Ashevillesubmarines based in Guam.

The USN and USAF have signed a USD 414 million contract for autonomously guided with onboard sensors, jam-resistant, and difficult to detect antiship LRASM.The stealthy Zumwalt-class warship—equipped with emerging technologies—can sail undetected in littoral waters and contested territories to launch LRASM and Tomahawk cruise missiles.

China is constructing military bases on islands in the South China Sea; however, this military infrastructure is vulnerable to US weapon systems, as the islands lack natural defenses and camouflage.

The antiship DF-21 missile, carried by colossal transporter erector launchers, has a range of 1,400 miles. The missile regiments are based in the barren Gobi Desert, which makes it an easy target for the US military. The DF-21 has been tested on a stationary ship, but it has not yet been successfully tested against a moving target.and provide mid-course updates as within one hour the ship will have moved 30 miles. China does not know about the DF-21 performance against the US CSG countermeasures.

The United States and Russia have not yet developed a missile equivalent to the DF-21. However, China lacks the C4ISR systems to strike targets at that range. China does not release the missile testing data, leading to many questions, including whether it can hit moving targets. Does it have precision targeting technologies?circumstantial inference andspeculation.

One can draw some historical parallels. For example, similarities exist between the unprepared Qing military during the Opium Wars and the contemporary PLA, which underestimates the US military.The Qing’s archaic military system made it difficult to deploy troops to counter the mobile British forces.China’s generals, such as Yi Shan and Yang Fang, were incompetent in the pivotal Battle of Canton in 1841, resulting in a defeat for China.

The Opium Wars have military parallels for the PLA. The wars led to the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the decimation of China’s military. The outcome of a contemporary war with the United States will be nearly identical to the political dimensions of the Opium Wars. The Tianjin Treaty of 1858, imposed by foreign powers, devastated China. Russia did not intervene but pressured China to cede a large part of its northeastern territory, including Vladivostok.

The US military dominates the strategic, tactical, and operational levels of warfare across the spectrum. The Pentagon is implementing sophisticated network warfare programs such as the Advanced Battle Management System, Project Convergence, and Joint All Domain Command and Control. China is concerned about the lethal and distributed US military, equipped with a potent combination of quantity and quality of weapon systems. The USN surpasses the PLAN in rapid deployment, maneuverability, and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The overwhelming display of US military power since 1945 is a credible deterrent for Beijing.Since the First Gulf War, the United States has demonstrated its capability of destroying the adversary through preemptive strikes consisting of long-range weapon systems such as cruise missiles in the first few days of the war, giving no time for the adversary to retaliate.

According to Taylor Fravel, China is not a military superpower.There is not much evidence about China’s plans for global military capabilities on par with the United States. China’s military power is miniscule as compared to United States’ former adversary the Soviet Union. China’s military will be thinly stretched defending the third-largest country in the world. The top echelons of the CCP and PLA acknowledge US military advantages. Chinese scholars like Xu Ruike and Sun Degang admit that China is an economic heavyweight but is a military featherweight and will remain so for the coming decades.

Mr. Sawant has a master’s in international affairs from Columbia University, where he concentrated in international security policy. He is a subject matter expert on military studies, defense, global security, and geopolitical risk analysis. Mangesh has more than 18 years of experience in studying military strategy and tactics, warfare, weapons systems analysis, conducting research, policy analysis and formulation, and developing case studies and lessons learned. Hisarticles have been published in The National Interest, Small Wars Journal, Modern Diplomacy, Eurasia Review, E-International Relations, Indian Defense Review, Security Management. Geopolitical Monitor, Internationale Politik, and the Over the Horizon Journal.

1 Ronald O"Rourke, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), 1–2,, https://fas.org/.

3 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth,America Abroad, The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 160.

5 Michael Beckley, “America Is Not Ready for a War with China, How to Get the Pentagon to Focus on the Real Threats, Foreign Affairs,” 10 June 2021