lcd panel case mod made in china

Case modding took off in the late 90s, and taught us all that computers could (and should!) look awesome. Much of the aesthetic went mainstream, and now tons of computer cases come with lights and windows and all the rest. [WysWyg_Protogen] realized those simple case windows could be way cooler with a neat LCD hack, and set to work.

The concept is simple. Take an old LCD monitor, remove the backlight and extraneous hardware, and then install it to the window in a computer case. When lit from behind via LEDs in the case, the screen creates a ghostly display through which the computer’s internals can still partially be seen. It’s a really compelling effect, and in theory, quite easy to achieve. All one need do is mount the stripped-down screen to the case and pipe it video from the graphics card.

In practice, it’s a little tricky. Disassembling the screen and removing things like the anti-glare coating can be tough to do without damaging the delicate panel inside. The windows typically used on computer cases can dull the effect, too. However, [WysWyg_Protogen] is continuing to tinker with the project and the results are getting increasingly impressive with each iteration. It doesn’t photograph too well, but it looks truly amazing in motion.

We often forget LCDs are transparent in their basic form, as we generally only use them with backlights or reflective backers. They really do look great when used in this transmissive way, though. Video after the break.

Actually beside myself right now. How does this look this good? This was a trash pile monitor and this looks like a 700 dollar case upgrade pic.twitter.com/4yBXlcY921

Hi everybody! Bill Owen from Mnpctech. I hope you"re having a great day! Several people have asked if I could share the steps on how I do my Touchscreen LCD mod in PC Computer case bezels, and you’ve come to the right video!

I’ve been using this Amazon 5 Inch Capacitive Touch Screens for $52.99 delivered on Amazon Prime, I’ll posted a link in Video description. The kit comes a with Micro USB for power and HDMI video connector, but these cables are too short for these PC case mods. It includes M3 stand-offs, a Driver Disc and some Instructions. It’s a 5 point Capacitive Touch screen with a Resolution of 800 x 460, which is just fine for it’s 5” viewing screen In addition to the LCD touchscreen, I will buy the following cables for my Desktop Custom PC LCD Case Mod.

One 3ft “Right Angle” 270 degree HDMI cord, 6” 90 Degree Angle HDMI Extension Adapter, and 3ft USB Male to Micro B power connector. For Mounting the LCD Touchscreen Panel, I use 3/16” thick Black acrylic to make custom mounting brackets for the LCD touch screen.

You can PAUSE the video on this page to record the measurements that I’ve made for cutting the acrylic. This PC Case Mod is very easy. "The reason I’m making brackets for my desktop PC LCD Monitor Mod?" I want the ability to easily install or remove the Touchscreen with thumbscrews. I’m using 1/8” drill bit for acrylic, and 6/32 thread tap, These Black thumbscrews from Mnpctech.com. I’ll use the 1/8” drill bit to increase the diameter of the holes in the LCD pcb frame.

I discovered these drill bits for plastic several years ago, Notice the bit isn’t splintering or cracking the acrylic as I make the holes. Mnpctech stocks a variety of these drills bits. My mod requires Twelve 6/32 washers, and links posted in description, “Why so many washers?” We want the Touchscreen to mount flush on the backside of the bezel, I also don’t want to apply any unnecessary pressure to the screen or the PCB, See how this sheet of paper easily slides under the screen Next stage is cutting the hole in the bezel, The best PC case for this mod is the ones without optical drive bays, which every popular case manufacturer now offers.

If you’re using an older case with 5.25 drive bays, you could attach a mounting plate with 5” opening that covers THREE 5.25 bays. That’s how we did this mod in the early days of PC Modding. Determine and measure out a location in the center of your bezel, you can also mount the LCD vertically if you prefer, and just change the screen orientation in Windows. Since the bezel is plastic, I’m using a Dremel with 1.5” reinforced cut off wheel, Don’t forget to always wear eye protection when using power tools. Oops, WTH? Hahaha After cutting our 5” diagonal square hole, I’ll hand file the edges so everything is precise and clean. You may have to remove sound insulation foam from backside of your bezel, I’m using E6000 adhesive to attach the two mounting brackets. This adhesive is very GOOEY at first, so consider masking off the screen, to prevent getting any of this on it. I like that it’s tacky for couple of minutes, so I have time to position the LCD in place, and then I’ll temporarily tape it in place while it cures overnight.

Mounting your Touchscreen LCD in the PC this way allows you to easily remove and re-install the LCD at any time. Especially if you ever need to replace it for some reason. Let’s get this LCD touchscreen connected to the PC, all of the cables are routed from the front to thee rear PCI slots. *3ft “Right Angle” 270 degree HDMI cord *6” 90 Degree Angle HDMI Extension Adapter cable, I plug this compact cable into the Touchscreen to save space. *3ft USB Male to Micro B power connector This mod is great if you want an extra screen for monitoring your hardware and temps. You can also display Weather or calendar or email notifications,

Check out http://www.Rainmeter.net this community offers several hundred custom mad graphic interfaces for FREE, and you can configure your screen to display a variety of updated information tasks Thanks for watching! And Again, all of the products used in this PC case mod are listed in the video description.

The Hyte Y60 is one of the best PC cases on the market, and it’s getting a big upgrade in the form of an official DIY mod kit. TheHyte Y60 LCD DIT kit is available now for $120, allowing you to replace one of the tempered glass panels of the case with a programable screen.

If you frequent PC builds on Reddit or Instagram, you’ve probably seen this mod before. For months, community members have bought screens that fit in the gap in Hyte’s case and used community 3D-printed mounts to attach them. In a Reddit thread several months back, in fact, the company responded to a user’s build with “THIS IS SO COOL.”

The screen comes with a resolution of 1920 x 515, and it’s not something you can control through software. Instead, the included driver board includes a mini HDMI connection that you’ll need to route through your PC and connect to your graphics card. After that, the panel will show up as another monitor in your operating system.

Originally, the mod was made for Aida64’s SensorPanel software, which allows you to display sensors like system utilization, CPU speed, and temperature in custom themes. You can still download and use these themes with Hyte’s DIY kit, but you can also display images, videos, or anything else you want.

The LCD kit was among Hyte’s CES 2023 announcements. The company also announced the new Hyte Y40 case, which is a slimmed-down version of the wildly popular Y60. Instead of the dual-chamber design of the Y60 and fish tank-like look, the Y40 opts for a traditional power supply basement and a slimmer form factor.

Although it’s smaller overall, the Y40 actually has more space for your graphics card, which could make a big difference with GPUs like the RTX 4090. The vertical GPU mount includes four slots as opposed to the three slots on the Y60. The case is also $50 cheaper, clocking in at $150.

Performance-PCs carries an assortment of side panels to customize your PC. We supply our customers with the most durable case mod parts available on the market. If your looking for a custom side panel with a window to show off your system then browse our collection from Lian Li, Antec, Cooler Master, Lancool, Silverstone, and more.

In this database you can submit your modded computer case creations to be viewed by the world. You may upload several pictures and people can post comments on your rig. A voting system is also in place.

To help understand, the water-cooled PC is in the bottom of a large Ikea glass vase modified, then turned upside down, with a large glass globe on top.

Tiny space but great results, I was able to fit 2 radiators one 240mm on the side and one 120 on top. I modified the side panel, removed the glass and designed a custom grill in 2.5mm carbon fiber (pr...

Tribute to fallout game"s 25th Anniversary.Custom window, cnc machined vaultec-tec fan grill, front modders mesh grill, and updated I/O panel. 7" LCD running Aida64. I"m using real NIXIE Clock and Old...

I love the aesthetic of old PC cases and I am a huge fan of the old and original Apple designs (Steve Jobs Era). I wanted a worthy successor for my Mac Pro 5.1 (The first real computer (not laptop) I ...

What makes it special, though, is the attention to detail. The door of the cassette deck now sports an LCD display, which shows the current song, or weather, or the time; the volume knob controls the volume, while the tuning and function knobs take care of horizontal and vertical scrolling. And the power button is still used to switch the whole thing on and off.

We first got a look at the Thermaltake Divider 550 TG Ultra at the company"s Expo event, coinciding with CES 2022 in January. Now the firm has released a full set of product pages for this showy mid-tower case with triple tempered glass sides and a 3.9 inch LCD screen atop of the front panel.

The Divider 550 TG Ultra"s USP is clearly its front embedded display panel. If not for this add-in, it would be a pretty standard hefty ATX case with a lot of tempered glass and room for a full sized (5.25 inch) optical drive to slot into the top.

From the images it looks like Thermaltake has decided to craft an LCD screen to fit into such a gap, but sadly the display area doesn"t fill the space, as it has quite significant bezels. Thermaltake quite breathlessly describes this 3.9 inch LCD screen as "a new way to monitor your PC’s performance and at the same time to show your own personality." In 2022 it might be more useful than an optical drive bay, but it isn"t revolutionary.

From the front you will also see Thermaltake has boldly fitted a trio of RGB fans. These are also configured using TT RGB Plus 2.0 software. Users can make the fan lighting work in harmony with the LCD display. Alternatively, it is possible to control and sync the fan LEDs with RGB motherboard software from Asus, Gigabyte, MSI, and ASRock. Anti software bloat purists can decide to control the fan lighting using the dedicated RGB button on the I/O panel. This button turns the RGB LEDs on and off and cycles through 27 color schemes and modes.

That more or less covers the Thermaltake Divider 550 TG Ultra"s "special sauce" that center around its triple RGB fan and LCD display fronted appearance. If you have got this far you might be interested in the essential tech specs such as case size, capacity, and maximum compatibility stats. We have tabulated this data below for your convenience.

Some niceties that are worth highlighting are the rotational PCIe slots, to make the case vertical or horizontally orientated GPU friendly. A rizer cable bracket and GPU support is included with the case too. Lastly, we are thankful Thermaltake has both USB Type-A and Type–C ports in the easy access I/O section atop of the case.

If readers are interested in acquiring a new PC case in the meantime, you would be advised to check out our recently updated guide to the Best PC Cases of 2022.

To establish a comprehensive picture of China’s activities and their impact, this project dug deeply into Chinese activism in four case countries in each region—eight countries in total.

The third of the three dimensions is critical because in the most vulnerable countries of these two regions, civil society and academia are often too fragile to provide balanced coverage of the activism of external powers. In some cases, Chinese funding and so-called united front tactics have shaped domestic narratives.

While China’s expanding footprint in Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe can bring socioeconomic opportunities, it can also exacerbate governance shortfalls, undermine political and economic stability, and complicate the EU’s ability to reach consensus on key issues. How countries manage their vulnerabilities and build resilience in their interactions with China is the key focus of this paper. It examines four countries in Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe—Greece, Hungary, Romania, and Georgia—who, despite their diversity, share certain common characteristics that affect their relations with China such as an eagerness to boost trade and investment from China. While not all four countries share identical vulnerabilities, and although China has been more successful in some countries than others, each case study nevertheless offers prescriptive lessons in how countries can manage vulnerabilities in different ways.

The goals and objectives of China’s activities in the four countries can broadly be described as threefold: to push Chinese exports and investments, exert political influence, and foster a positive image of China and relations with China. All four case countries are part of China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative. For example, in Greece, Chinese shipping giant COSCO has acquired a majority stake in the Port of Piraeus to create a regional transport and logistics hub in the Mediterranean as part of the maritime route of the BRI. China’s business model thrives in environments where local institutions and regulatory frameworks are weak and where local political and business leaders are eager to benefit from the lack of public scrutiny and transparency that often accompanies Chinese investments. A prime example of this is Hungary where the lack of public scrutiny or transparency benefits both China and local elites, further fueling local corruption and kleptocracy.

To varying degrees, Beijing has actively engaged in the region to foster a positive image of itself, promote its political and economic model, and shape local narratives about relations with China in all four countries. The presence of a weak civil society and oligarchic influence and control over media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can also provide opportunities for China to step in and fill the void. While China engages in some soft power efforts, such as people-to-people exchanges and cultural activities, most of these are small-scale or legacy relationships with little current relevance. Recently, the COVID-19 pandemic provided China with new opportunities to make inroads by providing much-needed assistance in the form of medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and eventually vaccine supplies.

However, rather than trying to win hearts and minds more widely, China’s soft power efforts are mostly directed at certain key influential elites in business, politics, academia, or NGOs. Chinese Confucius Institutes and academic partnerships in all four countries tend to be small-scale, but the massive planned construction of a Fudan University campus in Hungary, if completed, would constitute a major upgrade in China’s soft power presence at a time when academic freedom in the country is already in decline. Unlike elsewhere in Europe, where China has lately engaged in so-called wolf warrior diplomacy tactics, none of the four case countries have experienced any overtly aggressive Chinese diplomacy or massive influence operations on social media. Even so, public perceptions of China have deteriorated across the region (as they also have elsewhere across Europe), although Greece and Hungary are still among the most China-friendly countries in Europe.

Despite China’s increased role in the region in recent years and the presence of local vulnerabilities that China can exploit to its advantage, there are several points of resilience that limit China’s influence in the four case countries. For instance, while many countries in the region looked to China as an important economic and political partner after the global financial crisis more than a decade ago, they have gradually become disillusioned with Beijing’s ability to deliver on its promises or the specific terms of certain investment deals. As a result, two of its showcase initiatives, the BRI and the 17+1 format, are increasingly perceived by local governments as a vehicle for Beijing to exert political influence with few tangible results to show for. Political shifts in some European countries have also recently replaced more China-friendly parties with governments that are more skeptical of China and keener on reaffirming ties with the United States and the EU. In other cases, Chinese projects have been interrupted by pushback from local and subnational actors such as trade unions or municipal politicians.

Moreover, China’s soft power efforts appear to have had fairly little impact on improving China’s image in the region. In countries with vibrant media landscapes, China’s influence on shaping local debates and narratives is quite limited. Even in countries where perceptions of China were largely positive or neutral, opinions have soured in recent years, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. Accounting for the limited impact of Chinese soft power in the region is, first, the limited interest in China and its model especially from young pro-Western people. In addition, it is also possible that China’s inability to deliver on its economic promises, the growing international criticism of Beijing’s domestic and foreign policies, and China’s perceived role in the pandemic have all reduced the effectiveness of its public diplomacy. Even as China has stepped in to provide medical supplies and vaccines, overly politicized Chinese assistance has also prompted more hostile diplomatic and propaganda tactics.

This paper examines Chinese influence in four regional countries: Greece, Hungary, Romania, and Georgia. Much of Beijing’s activity in these four countries, as elsewhere in the world, can be characterized as regular commercial trade, which is broadly welcomed. The focus of this paper is on cases where Chinese influence has seemingly undermined democratic processes, fostered or taken advantage of corrupt practices, or been harnessed to a local political agenda.

While not all four of these countries share the same vulnerabilities, each case study offers prescriptive lessons, even when China is not intensely active or successful. Countries that manage those vulnerabilities in different ways can help teach others by sharing and comparing their experiences. For example, while three of the four countries are members of both the EU and NATO as well as the 17+1 format, nonmember Georgia, which has shown an interest in developing its ties with China, was included because it provides a useful comparison of Chinese tactics and successes across the broader region.

Still, in recent months, there has been a visible shift in Greece’s stance toward China. Domestic debates have grown tense and complex. Beijing offered modest help during the pandemic (and made sure the Greek public knew about it). Although the Chinese press depicts Sino-Greek relations in a positive light, Greeks no longer see China as a savior for their economy. In fact, polls show an increasingly defiant Greek public. The country’s conservative government, elected in mid-2019, has reaffirmed Greece’s strong commitment to the EU and NATO, and recent surveys suggest the public supports that stance.3 The cabinet of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis retained the EU’s triad definition of China as a partner, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival, and it has reaffirmed its full support for the transatlantic alliance, notably during former U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo’s visits in October 2019 and September 2020.

The Republic of Greece and the People’s Republic of China established diplomatic relations relatively late, in 1972.7 For years, center-right parties in Greece kept political ties with Beijing to a strict minimum, reflecting a strong traditional divide between the left and the right as well as a polarized attitude toward the United States that formed in the Cold War era. Former prime minister Andreas Papandreou, of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), was the first modern Greek leader to visit Beijing in 1986, followed by then Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang’s visit to Athens. Warmer relations followed. The hosting of successive—and successful—Olympics in Athens (2004) and Beijing (2008) brought the two governments even closer. For years, China had to make its first organized Olympics the most symbolic international event ever staged as part of the country’s renaissance. As the original Olympic nation, Greece was keen—and certainly flattered—to cooperate with China on this issue.

To cure Greece’s financial woes, international creditors imposed the privatization of state assets in addition to major structural reforms and belt-tightening. Despite the Greek electorate’s deep frustration over the latter, the Syriza-led left-wing coalition elected in 2015 had no choice but to follow suit.11 This was also the case regarding the Piraeus agreement.12 In fact, the left-wing coalition government turned around and opted to play the China investment card, perhaps even more forcefully than its predecessor. For example, then prime minister Alexis Tsipras surprised his European counterparts in July 2016 when he blocked an EU statement supporting the International Arbitration Court’s decision to rule against China in a case brought by the Philippines regarding the South China Sea.13 One year later, Greek diplomats blocked another EU statement at the United Nations (UN) that criticized China’s worsening human rights record. Tsipras’s decision was described as an opportunistic move (or perhaps as a bargaining tool with Beijing) by Western allies and commentators.14

Ever since the 2004 Athens Olympics (and especially since COSCO took over management of Piraeus), China has been courting the Greek public—with some success. Unlike other European countries, Greece has not been the target of China’s aggressive wolf warrior diplomacy (named for a popular Chinese blockbuster movie).65 Again, this softer diplomacy shows that China is playing a long-term game in Greece. As a sign of goodwill, Beijing has tried to remain accommodating and uncontroversial on its embassy’s Facebook and Twitter accounts. The Piraeus Port Authority has also been running soft communication campaigns through its own social media outlets. Although China’s image could be considered neutral in Greece, this moderate approach has yielded mixed results according to several recent surveys of the Greek public.

The outcome of such a policy, however, remains unclear. First, Greece has been busy handling its regional disputes with neighboring North Macedonia and, especially, Turkey. It needs NATO and the EU’s diplomatic and military support to counter Turkey’s militarization of the region surrounding Cyprus. Second, as is often the case with Chinese investment projects, the reality has differed from the initial proposition. “In the grand scheme of things . . . China invested in the port of Piraeus at a time when nobody was interested and it has been a successful investment,” Mitsotakis said in a recent interview. “But,” he went on to say, “Greece is not particularly dependent on Chinese investment, when I look at the map of Foreign Direct Investment, certainly I look at countries that are interested in investing in Greece.”77 Problems continue to accumulate around the Piraeus deal, and locals are more sensitive and angrier than expected about the benefits—or lack thereof—from COSCO’s financial involvement and oft-overbearing presence.

Hungary, having embraced closer ties with China in the early 2000s, is something of an outlier in the EU. It has become one of the most vulnerable countries in the region for Chinese influence under the government of current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Hungary’s vulnerability is due to relatively weak state institutions that are largely controlled by an increasingly authoritarian ruling party and the limited voice of civil society. The ease with which Beijing has facilitated elite capture plays an important part in China’s ability to cultivate key decisionmakers, who, in turn, are eager for better relationships with their Chinese counterparts. Orbán, who personally directs the country’s policy toward China, has been in power for over a decade and has troubled relations with his counterparts from Hungary’s traditional Western partners.78 Reportedly, Orbán views the Chinese government—which prioritizes the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of its diplomatic partners—as an alternative to the liberal West, where his counterparts have been highly critical of Hungary’s democratic backsliding.79 He and other prominent Hungarians speak warmly of China’s economic development model.

For Budapest, Beijing became a key partner for diversifying its economic policy away from Europe after the 2008 global financial crisis. Over time, Orbán has begun to shift Hungary’s foreign policy strategy toward Beijing as well. The Hungarian government uses China as leverage with Brussels and to posture to Euroskeptic sentiment at home. Under Orbán, Hungary has positioned itself as a regional hub for China in Central and Eastern Europe, although the Chinese financial flows to the country have been far less than expected just a few short years ago. For Beijing, Hungary is a relatively open door in Europe, given the Orbán government’s embrace of China as a diplomatic and economic interlocutor and his search for partners in advancing his illiberal model of governance at home. For the Chinese leadership, he is a useful interlocutor to help deflect international criticism of and stymie European consensus on Chinese human rights violations, particularly in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

However, it was Hungary’s socialist government, led by Péter Medgyessy, that first embraced Beijing in the mid-2000s, facilitating the first wave of Chinese economic investment in the country.88 Medgyessy today remains an advocate of engaging China. His long track record with Beijing dates back to his time as a minister in the pre-1989 communist government. He has continued to visit the country in his post-government career, frequently highlighting the country’s governance economic models in public speeches in China.89 His praise reflects consensus across the Hungarian political spectrum of China’s importance as a trade and investment partner.90 The bulk of early Chinese investment in Hungary during Medgyessy’s time consisted of small businesses in the trading and service sectors geared toward selling Chinese-produced goods.91 With time, however, multinational Chinese firms—including Bank of China, Huawei, Lenovo, Wanhua, and ZTE, among others—came to see the country as a stepping-stone for more ambitious endeavors across Europe.92

It is primarily Orbán’s longevity in office that has helped keep Budapest firmly in line with Beijing and eager to avoid public fights with China, as one Hungarian interlocutor described in a private workshop organized by Carnegie. This was particularly evident when Michael Kovrig, a dual Hungarian-Canadian citizen, was arrested on trumped-up charges related to a Canadian-Chinese dispute over the detention of Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, in British Columbia.97 Unlike Canada, Hungary appeared eager to avoid any public spat with Beijing and handled Kovrig’s case as a relatively low-level consular case, effectively outsourcing the issue to Ottawa.98 Hungarian officials in Beijing even avoided attending a public protest by the Western diplomatic community outside Kovrig’s trial. All of this suggests Budapest simply seeks to avoid alienating Beijing in public whenever possible.

The bulk of Chinese investment in the country under Orbán has not met expectations, although the flurry of recent high-profile projects could change that in coming years. China’s most successful projects in Hungary predate or coincide with Orbán’s 2010 return to office. China’s Wanhua Chemical Group, for example, is the largest investor in Hungary and an early symbol of the Eastern Opening policy’s success after the group acquired BorsodChem, a chemical plant in northern Hungary, for about $1.7 billion in 2010. The deal was formally signed by Orbán’s predecessor, but the actual investments occurred after he took power again. Additional cash flows to modernize the plant brought the total investment up to around $2.2 billion. The purchase positioned the Chinese company as a top producer of polyurethane materials in Europe and enhanced its role as one of the world’s prominent chemical producers—clearly a win for Wanhua and China.99 Wanhua’s acquisition of BorsodChem accounts for about 60 percent of cumulative direct and indirect Chinese investment in Hungary to date (roughly $3.7 billion), which suggests Chinese investment is lopsidedly concentrated in a few key industries and corporations.

Given the country’s central location in Europe, both Beijing and Budapest highlight the new railway’s ability to link up with the planned Trans-European Transport Network,114 enabling Budapest to serve as a key freight forwarding center in continental Europe. Yet north-south cargo traffic between the Mediterranean and Hungary currently is minimal, and it is unclear whether demand will grow enough in the coming decades to justify large financial outlays, particularly because there is an existing rail line that could be modernized at far less cost.115

The Georgian-Chinese relationship once again shows prospects of improving. In April 2021, the Georgian government accepted large shipments of Chinese vaccines, having received fewer than 75,000 doses from the EU by early May. Further shipments followed in the summer of 2021. Even modest Chinese investment can make a significant difference in a small economy like Georgia. Compared to Georgia’s affinity for the West, however, the China-Georgia relationship remains dominated by elites, with little resonance in wider society.

The China-Georgia relationship has primarily been driven by trade and Georgia’s ambitions to become an East-West transport hub. In the 1990s, many Western commentators promoted the idea of a new Silk Road in the South Caucasus and Central Asia—a modern iteration of the ancient trade route that connected China and Europe.221 The ambition was to develop a route that would bypass Russia and Iran, bringing anticipated oil and gas resources from the Caspian Sea to Western markets.

The Middle Corridor is more challenging to travel than the other two routes, as a report by Feride Inan and Diana Yayloyan lays out.230 Cargo must cross many borders and customs posts, as well as the Caspian Sea, which is prone to bad weather. On both the Middle Corridor and the northern route, trains entering Central Asia and then leaving Georgia must also change their gauge, because rails in the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union were wider than in China and Europe—another factor that increases cost and transit time. Azerbaijan has worked hard to make this route more attractive, principally by building the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, which opened in 2017 and has sharply reduced journey times. For China, this is an alternate connection to Europe (and, notably, one built without Chinese investment).231 Cargo volumes are rapidly growing but remain modest compared to the northern route. The volume of freight shipped by rail through Azerbaijan in 2020 increased rapidly to just over 150,000 TEU and there is set to be another big increase in 2021.232 So-called block trains, which operate from origin to destination with all documentation having been arranged in advance, are also now being used on this route. A block train arrived in Tbilisi on February 20, 2021, having left Xian in China twenty-one days before.233 In December 2020, a train took only two weeks to travel from Çerkezköy in Turkey to Xian.234

Moreover, the story of the Georgian elite’s opaque interaction with Chinese companies arguably cuts both ways. In some cases, as the Poti FIZ, it is the Georgian partners who have emerged stronger. Unlike Western countries and Russia, China does not have a high profile (either positive or negative) in Georgia. The public attitude toward the country can be summarized as indifference. A public opinion survey conducted for the U.S.-based International Republic Institute in February 2021 found that Georgians consider China neither a strong friend nor a threat.281 Only 11 percent of respondents said that China was Georgia’s “most important economic partner,” despite the strong trading relationship between the two countries. A total of 57 percent of respondents evaluated the China-Georgia relationship as good—a positive result for China, but still a poor score compared to almost all other major countries, except Iran (48 percent) and Russia (7 percent).

China likes to consider countries in Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe as part of a Chinese sphere of influence on the European continent. From Beijing’s perspective, the region’s position at the doorstep of the European Union makes it uniquely attractive. Amid significant local demands for infrastructure investments, the region has become a priority for Chinese investments in areas such as energy, transportation, and logistics. All four case countries in this paper are part of China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative. Three of them—Greece, Hungary, and Romania—are members of the 17+1 format, which Beijing leverages to engage with regional states on BRI-related issues. While China’s direct economic stakes in Romania and Georgia are fairly limited, Beijing sees both Greece and Hungary as potential hubs for Chinese expansion in Central and Southern Europe and beyond.

Meanwhile, Hungary remains willing to come to China’s aid. Though it has few illusions about China, Hungary’s government led by Viktor Orbán has repeatedly avoided public fights with Beijing, likely hoping to keep the door open for Chinese investments, garner diplomatic support over Hungary’s democratic backsliding, and communicate Hungary’s political and economic alternatives to Brussels. For example, in April and June 2021, Orbán’s government blocked EU statements about Hong Kong. Moreover, in June 2021, Hungary joined Greece in abstaining from a Canada-sponsored joint statement at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva against China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang.283 For Beijing, these efforts not only dilute the EU’s approach to China but also complicate the transatlantic community’s ability to reach consensus on Chinese-related issues such as human rights violations. In other cases, Hungary’s willingness to criticize EU actions—even if it does not formally try to prevent them—can still provide China with symbolic gains, allowing Beijing to claim that others in the West support China and similarly driving a wedge into the transatlantic community.

Beijing has actively engaged in the region to foster a positive image of itself, promote its political and economic model, and shape local narratives about relations with China. These narratives range from promoting “win-win” cooperation, stressing China’s “harmonious” rise, playing up the economic opportunities afforded by the BRI, emphasizing historical or cultural special bonds between local countries and China, or criticizing the United States. While promoting these narratives can take a variety of forms, there is little evidence to suggest that Beijing has sponsored a massive campaign to win hearts and minds in the four countries. Instead, China’s soft power efforts seem mostly directed at certain key influential elites in business, politics, academia, or NGOs. Public perceptions of China have lately deteriorated across the region, although Greece and Hungary are still among the most China-friendly countries in Europe.

Unlike many others in Europe, none of the four case countries have experienced any overtly aggressive Chinese diplomacy or influence operations on social media. Chinese embassies in the region have, for most part, maintained low profiles and avoided engaging in the type of wolf warrior diplomacy seen in countries like Sweden, France, and the Czech Republic (especially during the COVID-19 pandemic). This could be due to China’s lack of strategic stakes in these countries, or possibly a dearth of sensitive issues that might warrant a more assertive approach. Chinese officials are also wary of upending their relatively friendly relations with local governments.

China’s business model thrives in environments where local institutions and regulatory frameworks are relatively weak. Many political and economic elites in the region appear eager to benefit from the lack of transparency that often accompanies Chinese investments. Governments struggle to vet or monitor Chinese economic or political activities, while civil society and the media are often able to voice their concerns only after a deal has been signed. Countries in Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe generally provide China with a more hospitable business environment than in Western Europe, where countries have more stringent FDI screening mechanisms and transparency requirements.

Countries like Hungary and Romania both struggle with broad corruption and governance problems that have created weak regulatory frameworks. Once again, the lack of public scrutiny or transparency benefits both China and local elites. Hungary, especially, is a hospitable place for China, and the Budapest–Belgrade railway is a high-profile example of why this is the case.

Several factors mitigate some of the most glaring economic vulnerabilities. First, there is growing skepticism about China’s ability to deliver on its many lofty promises, even in Hungary. Countries, which a decade ago held high expectations about the potential benefits of Chinese investments, have become gradually disillusioned with Beijing’s ability to deliver on its promises. Though China is still perceived as an important economic partner, the much-touted BRI has resulted in few tangible projects and the 17+1 format is increasingly perceived by local governments as a vehicle for Beijing to exert political influence. A case in point is Romania, which has seen a significant increase in bilateral trade with China but little in terms of Chinese investments.

Second, even in cases where Chinese-funded projects have materialized, there is also growing apprehension about the conditions of Chinese engagement. This has to do with growing frustration and discontent over the terms of specific Chinese investment deals in many states (for example, ownership stakes, labor rights, environmental degradation, and the lack of benefits for local companies and workers). Some Chinese projects are infrastructure or so-called brownfield investments (when a company invests in an existing facility to launch a new operation), which have relatively little impact on sustainable job creation in new employment sectors. This shifting sentiment is particularly evident in Greece, which only a few years back regarded China as an economic savior but both the public and the government have since become disillusioned.

Third, several of the countries have tightened up their investment screening frameworks in recent years after being urged to do so by the EU and the United States. Growing pressure from Brussels and Washington has also influenced decisions to grant Chinese companies major tenders and contracts involving critical sectors or assets. Several of the case countries have also rejected Chinese offers due to concerns about the terms. The main exception is Hungary, which appears to keep its doors wide open to Chinese investments, even if expectations have not been met in recent years.

While members of the 17+1 club have had high expectations that Chinese investments would bring significant socioeconomic benefits, there are signs of growing disappointment among local and subnational groups against some of China’s projects. In several cases, deals with China have even been rejected or canceled, interrupted, or reversed due to such bottom-up pressures.

Once again, the Port of Piraeus is an indicative example. While COSCO’s investment in the port was long heralded as a major achievement and undoubtedly has led to an impressive turnaround of the previously crisis-ridden port, more recently local stakeholders such as municipal politicians, shipowners, and labor unions have begun to push back. Their protests have prevented the government from approving the construction of a new container terminal at the port (although it is generally expected that a compromise will eventually be found for the final stake to be acquired by COSCO). In another case, in Georgia, local workers launched a strike against the Chinese company building the Tbilisi–Batumi railway over concerns about low pay and bad working conditions. China’s bid for the Anaklia port received pushback over local concerns that it would not provide sufficient employment opportunities. In contrast, fewer protests from local labor unions and civil society have occurred in Hungary, despite similar concerns about the terms of certain Chinese deals and the lack of economic opportunities they bring. The country’s democratic decline and clampdown on civil society have opened doors for new Chinese projects. One notable exception is the recent public backlash against the Fudan University campus in Budapest.

These examples point to the clear limits of China’s business model in Europe. While perhaps suitable in developing countries with fewer restrictions, some Chinese companies are less well equipped to handle situations in Europe when faced with tough legal or environment requirements or when subject to government and public scrutiny.

Accounting for the limited impact of Chinese soft power in the region is, first, the fact that local people have limited interest in Chinese affairs, its culture, or its model. In addition, it is also possible that China’s inability to deliver on its economic promises, the growing international criticism of Beijing, and China’s perceived role in the pandemic have all reduced the effectiveness of its public diplomacy. Moreover, while China maintains legacy relationships and has made inroads with certain elite groups, younger generations in countries like Greece and Romania tend to be more pro-Western and skeptical of China. Chinese academic scholarships and Confucius Institutes do not add up to very much when compared to academic opportunities in the EU, the UK, or the United States. However, plans for a new massive Fudan University campus in Hungary would mark a major shift in China’s soft power presence; given the lack of clarity from where its student body will hail, it also could eventually bring an influx of Chinese students to Budapest and offer them a glimpse of life in the EU.

China has not been uniformly successful across Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe. Two of its showcase initiatives, the BRI and the 17+1 format, have had more symbolic than actual influence. However, the story is notably different for many countries in the Western Balkans such as Serbia where China is leveraging a considerable amount of influence. Some societies are proving more resilient than others at identifying the perils of engaging with Beijing and weighing those risks against the potential rewards. Furthermore, while it is important to discern China’s growing influence in the region, not every instance of Chinese soft power is effective or inherently negative. Chinese vaccine diplomacy for example, may be aimed at improving China’s image, but can also enhance public health even though the efficacy of Chinese-made vaccines has been questioned. Educational exchanges and Chinese-language programs may build Beijing-friendly constituencies, but greater awareness of and knowledge about China could yield both positive and negative results. Understanding China is an essential step toward meeting the challenge Beijing poses to the liberal international order. Similarly, exposure by Chinese students to life in the West should be welcomed and great lengths should be made to ensure that Chinese citizens studying or working in Europe do not become subject to racist backlashes. Leaders in the West therefore should develop multipronged and nuanced approaches to address these issues:

Avoid assigning strategic significance to all of China’s actions. Many of Beijing’s economic activities are commercial and uncontroversial in nature. Making sure that Chinese overseas citizens and legitimate Chinese businesses in Europe are not unduly targeted or face racist backlashes is vitally important. Yet, cheap Chinese goods sometimes risk flooding local markets and undercut local production and economies. As the four case country analyses suggest, China’s own activities do not adhere to a one-size-fits-all format. Instead, they are often tailored to individual countries’ national contexts and needs. Washington and Brussels should avoid employing a “whack-a-mole” approach to China’s activities in the region. A better strategy would be to, on the one hand, seek to better understand local demands and, on the other, provide technical training to increase officials’ ability to evaluate the impacts of proposed Chinese projects. Similarly, Southeastern, Central, and Eastern European countries should weigh their own specific long-term needs against what Chinese and other international companies are offering. Quick money and a rapidly developed infrastructure project might be a short-term fix for a sitting politician but may not be sustainable for the country in the long run.

Don’t overfocus on soft power.While China has actively tried to promote itself by leveraging a variety of soft power efforts—such as media outreach, cultural events, academic partnerships, and cooperation with NGOs and political groups—these efforts tend to be small-scale in nature and not particularly influential. Most of China’s soft power outreach targets certain influential elites rather than entire citizenries. Even the Confucius Institutes, which have garnered a lot of attention in the West for being potential vectors of malign Chinese influence, appear to be mostly inconsequential, though there is still a need to ensure that regional universities conduct thorough due diligence when entering into academic partnerships with China. Here the United States and the EU should step in and provide alternative funding to build up local research centers focusing on understanding China consistent with European values. A clear illustration of Beijing’s limited soft power reach is the fact that regional perceptions of China have soured recently in all four countries, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. This suggests that China’s narratives do not appeal to most people in the region, especially younger generations who tend to be more oriented toward the West. Though there is still a great deal of interest in Beijing as an economic partner, China itself, its model, and its international behavior are far less attractive.

Deny China diplomatic openings.In Georgia, the United States and the EU failed to help the government acquire enough Western-manufactured COVID-19 vaccines. In Hungary, the EU’s slow vaccine rollout presented an opportunity for Orbán to highlight his alternatives. In both cases, China stepped in to fill the void. These are missteps that cannot be undone but avoiding similar policy shortcomings in the future is critical, particularly in regions where the pandemic continues to ravage public health and local economies. Furthermore, enhancing awareness that Beijing’s mask and vaccine diplomacy was largely conducted on a commercial—not humanitarian—basis can help highlight differences between the benefits of EU membership or U.S. assistance programs and limited Chinese largesse.

The authors would like to thank Thomas Carothers, Evan Feigenbaum, Andreea Brinza, Tamas Matura, Rui Pinto, Plamen Tonchev, and Boris Wenzel for helpful feedback on earlier drafts as well as Venesa Rugova, Alexander Taylor, and Tatyana Pyak for research assistance and support. Funding for this project was provided by a grant from the U.S. State Department. The paper was informed by interviews, media monitoring in local languages, and four workshops with local experts and decisionmakers from the four case countries held between September 2020 and March 2021.

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